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Class Arbitration: Is it for the Court or an Arbitrator to Decide?
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of companies that use arbitration clauses has increased. 1 For example,
common news outlets such as CNN have incorporated arbitration clauses into their terms of
service. 2 The increase in popularity of arbitration clauses has caused questions regarding the
interpretation of arbitration agreements when an arbitration clause is not specific and is ambiguous
as to class arbitration. This occurs when an arbitration clause contains direct language that certain
matters will be arbitrated but the clause is ambiguous on class arbitration.3 The ambiguity creates
a problem determining whether the consumer or employee can join with other class members when
the arbitration clause does not explicitly waive it.
Currently, the United States has a strong policy in favor of arbitration evidenced by the
Federal Arbitration Act.4 In light of this policy, courts will uphold arbitration clauses unless there
are “grounds in law or equity” to revoke the clause. 5 Who makes the decision whether class
arbitration is permissible under an arbitration agreement has become an increasingly important
issue. The issue of who decides whether class arbitration is permissible arises when an arbitration
clause does not have a class action waiver and does not specifically state that arbitrators are decide
whether or not class arbitration is permissible.6
1

Kathleen Pender, Wells Fargo Tightens Tough Arbitration Agreement, SF TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2012)
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Wells-Fargo-tightens-tough-arbitration-agreement-2575609.php (“more
companies have added clauses to forced arbitration agreements prohibiting consumers from initiating or
participating in class-action suits.”); David S. Clancy & Matthew M.K. Stein, “An Uninvited Guest: Class
Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act's Legislative History,” 63 BUS. LAW. 55, 56 (2007); Theodore Eisenberg
et al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 871, 880, 882-84 (2008)
2
See Terms of Service (January 18, 2015) http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/06/world/terms-service/
3
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1764, 1772 (2010); Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.,
761 F.3d 326, 332-334 (3d Cir. 2014)
4
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858 (1984); Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468,
476, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1254 (1989); 9 U.S.C.S § 2
5
9 U.S.C.S § 2
6
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1764, 1772 (2010)
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The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether courts or arbitrators decide if an arbitration
clause permits class-wide arbitration. Currently, there is a split in the circuit courts on the issue.
Two circuit courts have ruled that a court rather than an arbitrator should decide whether an
arbitration clause allows class arbitration.7 Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit, prior to the most recent
Supreme Court decisions on class arbitration, held that arbitrators should decide whether or not an
arbitration clause permits class arbitration.8
It is important to classify the question of class arbitrability as a “gateway” matter or a
“subsidiary” matter in order to address whether the question of class arbitrability is for an arbitrator
or a court to decide. Gateway matters address whether the parties’ action is governed by the
arbitration agreement.9 In other words, they relate to whether or not the parties are bound by the
arbitration agreement or whether a binding arbitration clause applies to the particular issue. 10 For
example, jurisdictional or threshold issues are gateway matters.

11

Conversely, subsidiary

questions are questions that “grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition.”12 Normally,
gateway matters are for the court to decide and subsidiary matters are for the arbitrators to decide.13
Unless the parties explicitly allocate gateway issues to an arbitrator, the gateway matters are for a
court to address.14
Because class arbitration is inherently different than bilateral arbitration, this note focuses

7

Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 2014); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th
Cir. 2013)
8
Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 2003)
9
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 (2002)
10
Id.
11
Paul Bennett IV, Waiving" Goodbye to Arbitration: A Contractual Approach, 69 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1628
(2012)
12
Id. (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S.Ct. 909, 918 (1964))
13
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84, 123 S.Ct. 588, 592 (2002)
14
Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielson, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion And The Future
Of American Arbitraiton, 22 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 323, 347-349 (2011); See e.g. AT&T Techs. v. Communs.
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 106 S.Ct. 1415 (1986);
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on why a court should decide whether or not the arbitration agreement permits class-wide
arbitration. This note does not address non-class joinder issues or other multiparty arbitration
issues. Class arbitration is different from non-class joinder because of the class size15 and the type
of relief requested and therefore this analysis focuses solely on class arbitration.16
Part II provides a brief background on the Federal Arbitration Act, Supreme Court
decisions discussing class arbitrability, and the circuit split addressing who decides the question
of class arbitration. Part III will explain why the Third and Sixth Circuit analyses are correct in
determining that a court should decide whether or not an agreement permits class arbitration. The
analysis will focus on why that the question of class arbitrability is a gateway matter and why the
courts are better equipped to deal with the issue of class arbitrability. Further, it will discuss the
repercussions of having a court decide whether an arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration.
Part IV will summarize the analysis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FEEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
The United States has a strong policy in favor of arbitration.17 In 1925, the United States
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in order to ensure that parties’ agreements
were enforced.18 The Savings Clause of the FAA states,
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction,
15

AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, Rule 4(a)(1) available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004
129.pdf; See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a); JAMS Class Action Procedures, Rule 3(a) available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/
16
S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration Change the Nature of Arbitration? Stolt- Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First
Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 218-19 (2012) (“Class arbitrations involve representative, rather than
individual, claims”); Maureen Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class
Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711 (discussing due process concerns with class arbitration)
17
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 858 (1984)
18
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1242 (1985)
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or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C.S § 2. This portion of the FAA is important because it makes arbitration agreements
enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”19 Therefore, arbitration agreements will control how parties proceed in their dispute
despite whether or not a party prefers to resolve the matter in court. The FAA also states that the
court can make an “order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.” 20 This means that arbitration agreements are contracts and will be
interpreted by the court through the lens of contract law. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
maintained that parties have leeway to limit their own arbitration agreement.21 Thus, parties may
incorporate terms into their arbitration agreement if they so choose. The strong policy favoring
arbitration and a policy adherencing to the terms agreed upon by the parties creates the backdrop
for the class arbitrability issue at hand.
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Currently, there is no majority Supreme Court decision that addresses who decides whether
an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration when the arbitration agreement does not specify
who decides the issue.22 Bazzle was the first Supreme Court decision to directly discuss the issue
of who decides if an arbitration agreement permits class arbitrability.23 Following Bazzle, the court
has addressed the issue of class arbitration in several Supreme Court decisions, but has not decided

19

9 U.S.C.S § 2
9 U.S.C.S § 4
21
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011) (“[The arbitration agreement] can be specified,
for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential to
protect trade secrets.”
22
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2068 n.2 (2013)
23
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003)
20
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whether class arbitration is a gateway issue or subsidiary issue when an arbitration agreement is
silent on whether it permits class arbitration.24
1. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle was the first Supreme Court case to address the issue
squarely, but the Supreme Court failed to obtain a majority of the justices in its decision. 25
Respondents Lynn and Burt Bazzle received a home improvement loan with an arbitration clause
from Green Tree.26 The arbitration clause read:
“ARBITRATION--All disputes, claims, or controversies arising
from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result
from this contract . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by
one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you. This arbitration
contract is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce,
and shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C.
section 1 [9 U.S.C.S. § 1] . . . . THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY
AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A
JURY TRIAL, EITHER PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION
UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION
BY US (AS PROVIDED HEREIN). . . . The parties agree and
understand that the arbitrator shall have all powers provided by the
law and the contract. These powers shall include all legal and
equitable remedies, including, but not limited to, money damages,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief."27
Both sets of customers claimed that Green Tree failed to provide a form that explained that they
had a right to name their own lawyers and insurance agents.28
The Bazzles wished to certify a class in their action, and Green Tree “sought a stay of the
court proceeding.” 29 The South Carolina state trial court certified the class and compelled

See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559
U.S. 662 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011)
25
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003)
26
Id. at 447 (“Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs [also] entered into loan contracts and security
agreements for the purchase of mobile homes with Green Tree.”)
27
Id. at 448
28
Id.
29
Id. at 449
24
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arbitration and the arbitrator awarded “the class $10,935,000 in statutory damages, along with
attorney's fees.30” Lackey and the Buggses also sought class certification in court.31 The trial court
denied Green Tree’s motion to compel arbitration and the state court of appeals reversed. 32 The
parties proceeded to pick an arbitrator and the arbitrator certified class arbitration.33 The arbitrator
“awarded the class $9,200,000 in statutory damages in addition to attorney's fees.” 34 Green Tree
appealed both cases, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina consolidated the cases. 35 The court
held that the contracts “were silent in respect to class arbitration, that they consequently authorized
class arbitration, and that arbitration had properly taken that form.”36 The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari.37
The Supreme Court examined whether the arbitration clause at issue permitted class-wide
arbitration. 38 Green Tree argued that class arbitration was impermissible under the arbitration
agreement.39 The plurality held that the arbitrator should decide whether the arbitration agreement
permitted class arbitration.40 The plurality stated that the question of whether class arbitration is
permitted in the arbitration agreement is not a gateway matter.41 Gateway matters are for the court
to decide and include issues “such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all
or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.”42 The
plurality reasoned that the question at issue was not about the “validity of the arbitration clause

30

Id.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 449
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 450
36
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450
37
Id.
38
Id. at 450
39
Id. at 450
40
Id. at 453
41
Id.
42
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452
31
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nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties” but about “what kind of
arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to,” therefore it is a procedural matter for the arbitrator
to decide.43 The plurality further explained that the question “concern[ed] contract interpretation
and arbitration procedures” which the Court believed “[a]rbitrators [were] well situated to
answer.”44
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the plurality on the issue of class
arbitrability. The Chief Justice stated that the question of what to be submitted to arbitration is an
issue for the courts to decide, and not for an arbitrator.45 The Chief Justice believed that “the
decision of what to submit to the arbitrator is a matter of contractual agreement by the parties, and
the interpretation of that contract is for the court, not for the arbitrator.”46 After providing reason
for the court to make the ultimate decision about the arbitration clause, the Chief Justice then
interpreted the arbitration agreement to “expressly define ‘us’ as petitioner, and ‘you’ as the
respondent or respondents named in that specific contract.”47 Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that
the arbitration agreement made clear that the parties had not agreed to class arbitration.48
2. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.
After Bazzle, the Supreme Court addressed whether an arbitrator can require class
arbitration when the parties are silent on the issue in the arbitration agreement in Stolt-Nielsen.49
Stolt-Nielson is a shipping company that ships products for their customers and AnimalFeeds is a
supplier of raw ingredients. 50 AnimalFeeds shipped its products pursuant to a charter party

43

Id.
Id. at 453
45
Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
46
Id. at 456 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
47
. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 458-59 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
48
Id. at 459-460 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting)
49
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010)
50
Id. at 666
44
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contract. 51 Stolt-Neilsen was engaged in a price fixing scheme, and AnimalFeeds sued StoltNeilsen in federal district court asserting antitrust claims.52 Many other parties sued Stolt-Neilsen
and the “Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered the consolidation of then-pending
actions against petitioners, including AnimalFeeds’ action.” 53 AnimalFeeds then served StoltNielsen with a demand for class arbitration and the parties agreed that “the question of class
arbitration be submitted to a panel of three arbitrators.”54 The parties picked three arbitrators and
agreed that their arbitration agreement was silent on the issue of class arbitration.55 The panel of
arbitrators then concluded that the arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration.56 The District
Court then vacated the award and held that the arbitrators’ decision was in “manifest disregard of
the law.” 57 The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.58
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, holding that the arbitrators’ decision was
contrary to the FAA, which requires consent to arbitrate.59 The Court reasoned that the arbitrators
lacked a contractual basis for ordering class arbitration because the parties had previously agreed
that their arbitration agreement was silent on the whether class arbitration was permitted. 60 In
addition, the court stated that “class arbitration changes the nature of bilateral arbitration to such a
degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their
disputes to an arbitrator.”61 In so holding, the Court distinguished Bazzle because the parties in
Stolt-Nielson had expressly agreed that contract interpretation was to be submitted to an arbitration

51

Id. at 667
Id.
53
Id. at 667-668
54
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 668
55
Id.
56
Id. at 668-669
57
Id. at 669 (internal quotations omitted)
58
Id. at 670
59
Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 684
60
Id.
61
Id. at 685
52
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panel.62 Thus, the Court did not believe it needed to address the issue of who decides the class
arbitrability, because the parties in Stolt-Nielson assigned the issue of arbitrability to an
arbitrator.63 In addition, the Court explained that Bazzle was a plurality decision and did not bind
the court to permit the arbitrator to decide whether class arbitration is permitted.64
3. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court addressed “whether the FAA
prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of class-wide arbitration procedures.”65 The Concepcions66 entered into a contract with
AT&T for the servicing of cell phones. 67 The arbitration agreement stipulated that there be
arbitration for all disputes and that the claims “be brought in the parties' individual capacity, and
not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” 68 The
Concepcions filed a complaint in district court and argued that the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable because it prevented class procedures.69 The Ninth Circuit and the District Court
believed that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.70 The Ninth Circuit did not believe
that the California Supreme Court decision, Discover Bank v. Superior Court, was preempted by
the FAA.71
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that California’s Discover Rule was preempted by
the FAA because it interferes with arbitration. 72 The Court reasoned that class arbitration

62

Id. at 680
Id.
64
Id.
65
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011)
66
Id. (referring to Vincent and Liza Concepcion)
67
Id.
68
Id. (internal quotations omitted)
69
Id. at 1744- 1745
70
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)
71
Id. at 1745
72
Id. at 1750
63
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“manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual” was inconsistent with the FAA because
of the inherent differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration. 73 The Court
addressed several factors of class arbitration that make it inherently different than bilateral
arbitration, including sacrificing the informality of bilateral arbitration, mandating procedural
formality, and increasing the risk to defendants because there are more defendants to one
decision.74
4. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter
Most recently in Oxford Health LLC v. Sutter, the Supreme Court addressed whether an
arbitrator exceeded his powers under the FAA when he found that an arbitration agreement
permitted class arbitration. 75 The respondent, John Sutter, was a pediatrician who agreed to
provide healthcare to Oxford Health Plans’ members within its network.76 Sutter entered into a
contract with Oxford Health Plans, which contained an arbitration agreement.77 Sutter, on behalf
of a class, filed a complaint in New Jersey Superior Court.78 The suit was referred to arbitration
and the parties agreed to have an arbitrator decide if class arbitration was permissible under the
agreement.79 The arbitrator found that class arbitration was permissible.80 The arbitrator reasoned
the intent of the arbitration clause was to mandate arbitration for all civil actions that could be
brought in court and the arbitrator found that a class action is a type of civil action.81 Oxford filed
a motion in the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision and the district court denied the

73

Id. at 1750-1751
Id. at 1751-1752
75
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013)
76
Id. at 2067
77
Id. (The arbitration agreement read: “No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be
instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey,
pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.”)
78
Id.
79
Id
80
Sutter, 133 S.Ct. at 2067 (2013)
81
Id.
74
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motion.82 The Third Circuit affirmed the decision.83 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.84
The Supreme Court found that the arbitrator did not exceed his powers when he reviewed
the contract.85 The Court explained that the holding in Stolt-Nielson could not be applied because
the parties in that case had agreed beforehand that the agreement was silent on the issue of class
arbitration. 86 The Supreme Court further distinguished Stolt-Nielson because the arbitration
decision in that case “lacked any contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it
lacked… a sufficient one.”87 The Supreme Court noted that it has not addressed “whether the
availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability” and would not do so within the Oxford
Health decision.88 Thus, the question of class arbitrability was left open.
C. Circuit Cases Agreeing That An Arbitrator May Determine If Class Arbitration
is Permitted Under An Arbitration Agreement
The recent Supreme Court decisions have expanded on the issue of class arbitration.
Currently, there is a circuit split amongst the circuit courts as to who decides if an arbitration
agreement permits class arbitration if the contract is silent on the question. The Fifth Circuit, in an
older opinion, has taken the Bazzle stance and it has ruled that the arbitrators are better positioned
to address whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration. The Third and Sixth Circuits
have used recent Supreme Court precedent and dicta in their reasoning and have concluded that
courts are better positioned to address whether an arbitration agreement permits class arbitration.
1. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc.

82

Id. at 2068
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 2069
86
Sutter, 133 S.Ct. at 2069 (2013)
87
Id. at 2069-2070 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original)
88
Id. at 2068 n.2
83
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In Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 89 the Fifth
Circuit held that an arbitrator should determine if the arbitration agreement permits class-wide
arbitration, citing the decision of the Bazzle plurality.90 North American Indemnity91 had “entered
into reinsurance contracts with 408 [self funded ERISA] Plans throughout the United States” and
there were arbitration clauses92 in each contract.93 North American Indemnity allegedly breached
the contracts by defaulting on payments of claims and then sued American Heartland Health
Administrators, the third party administrator of the plans, for poor underwriting of the plans.94 The
employer self-funded ERISA plans95 that contracted with North American Indemnity intervened
in the action and the district court then discussed the possibility of certifying a class for
arbitration. 96 Pedcor argued against the class being certified and appealed the district court’s
decision to certify the class.97
The Fifth Circuit believed the question of class arbitrability was resolved by the Bazzle
plurality decision. 98 The court reasoned that this case was analogous to Bazzle and should be
decided under the Bazzle rule; therefore, the arbitrator should decide the question of class

89

343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 2003)
91
Id. at 357 (North American Indemnity is an insurance company)
92
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (The arbitration agreements required “(1) any dispute between the parties hereto
in connection with the Agreement be submitted to arbitration; (2) as a general matter each party chooses one
arbitrator, and the two chosen arbitrators then select a third to constitute a panel; and (3) arbitration shall be
governed by the laws of the State of Texas. There is no express provision in the clause regarding consolidation or
class treatment of claims in arbitration.”)
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan, 343 F.3d at 357
97
Id.
98
Id. at 359
90
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arbitrability. 99 The court agreed with the Bazzle analysis because the question of whether an
arbitration clause permits class arbitration is a subsidiary question.100
D. Circuit Cases Disagreeing That An Arbitrator May Determine If Class
Arbitration is Permitted Under An Arbitration Agreement
1. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett
The Sixth Circuit in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett,101 was the first circuit after the recent
Supreme Court decisions102 to consider the question of whether a court or an arbitrator may decide
when an arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration. 103 Crockett was a customer of
LexisNexis, a business division of Reed Elsevier, and he had a plan with the company that
contained an arbitration clause.104 Crockett filed an arbitration demand on behalf of two classes
and LexisNexis brought suit in district court “seeking a declaration that the Plan's arbitration clause
does not authorize class arbitration.”105 The arbitration agreement did not specifically mention
class arbitration.106 The District Court in Ohio granted LexisNexis summary judgment based on
the arbitration agreement not permitting class arbitration.107
In the decision, the Sixth Circuit first addressed whether an arbitrator or a court determines

99

Id.
Id. at 350 (quoting Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 2407) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The question whether a
contract forbids class arbitration concerns the kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to, and not the
validity of the arbitration clause [ ]or its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties, the plurality
concluded that arbitrators are well situated to answer that question.”)
101
734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013) (hereinafter short name referred to as ‘Reed Elsevier’).
102
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (2003); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011); Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013)
103
Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 597
104
Id. at 596
105
Id
106
Id. at 599 (The arbitration agreement stated “Except as provided below, any controversy, claim or counterclaim
(whether characterized as permissive or compulsory) arising out of or in connection with this Order (including any
amendment or addenda thereto), whether based on contract, tort, statute, or other legal theory (including but not
limited to any claim of fraud or misrepresentation) will be resolved by binding arbitration under this section and the
then-current Commercial Rules and supervision of the American Arbitration Association”)
107
Id. at 596
100
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if class-wide arbitration is permitted under the arbitration agreement.108 The Court explained that
gateway disputes109 are for judicial determination and subsidiary questions110 are for an arbitrator
to decide.111 The court reasoned that recent Supreme Court decisions have alluded that class-wide
arbitrability is a gateway question and not a subsidiary question.112 The Court stated that because
the Supreme Court has found the differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration to
be “fundamental” the issue is a gateway question. 113 The Court relied on Stolt-Nielson and
Concepcion to explain some of the inherent differences between class arbitration and bilateral
arbitration.114 The court stated the benefits of bilateral arbitration, including “lower costs, greater
efficiency and speed,” are less secure in class arbitration.115 These benefits, therefore, give rise to
the assumption that the parties may not have mutually consented to class arbitration if it was not
specifically stated in the arbitration agreement. 116 The court also stated that confidentiality
becomes more difficult with class arbitration.117 In addition, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
“the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action
litigation.”118
The Sixth Circuit also claimed that a switch from bilateral arbitration to class arbitration

108

Reed Elsevier, Inc., 734 F.3d at 597
Id. at 597 (quoting Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452)( The court noted that “Gateway disputes include whether the parties
have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type
of controversy.)
110
Id. at 597 (quoting John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557, 84 S. Ct. 909, 11 L. Ed. 2d 898
(1964) (internal quotations omitted)) (explaining that “subsidiary questions grow out of the dispute and bear on its
final disposition); Id. (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,, 537 U.S. 84-85 (2002) (internal quotations
omitted))
(“Subsidiary questions include, for example, issues related to waiver, delay, or whether a condition precedent to
arbitrability has been fulfilled.”)
111
Id. at 597
112
Id. at 598
113
Id. at 598
114
Reed Elsevier, Inc., 734 F.3d at 598 (6th Cir. 2013)
115
Id. at 598 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010))
116
Id. at 598 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686, (2010))
117
Id. at 598
118
Id. at 598 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686, (2010))))
109

14

may raise due process concerns. 119 The Court stressed how consequential the class-wide
arbitrability question was.120 The Court held that whether an arbitration agreement permits class
arbitration is a gateway issue and therefore is for a court to decide. 121 The Court went on to hold
that the arbitration agreement did not permit class-wide arbitration, and, thus, affirmed the lower
court.122
2. Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc.
The Third Circuit has also addressed the question of whether a court or an arbitrator may
decide when an arbitration clause permits class-wide arbitration.123 McCabe and Opalinski were
employees of Robert Half International, Inc.124 McCabe and Oplainski brought a class claim on
behalf of themselves and other employees based on Robert Half’s failure to pay them overtime.125
They signed employment agreements with Robert Half in which the arbitration clause makes no
mention of class-wide arbitration.126 Robert Half moved to compel arbitration on an individual
basis. 127 The District Court affirmed in part and compelled arbitration, but ruled that the issue of
whether it would be bilateral or class arbitration would be for an arbitrator to decide.128 Robert
Half appealed to the Third Circuit for a determination of whether the arbitrator or the court makes
the decision about the arbitration agreement permitting class arbitration.129
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The Third Circuit held that availability of class arbitration in an arbitration agreement is a
matter for courts to decide.130 The court cast doubt on the plurality decision in Bazzle citing StoltNielson and Oxford Health, which both mentioned a Supreme Court majority had yet to decide the
specific issue at bar.131 Further, the Third Circuit addressed its previous decision Quilloin v. Tenet
HealthSystem Philadelphia Inc.,132 which stated that class-wide arbitration is not a question of
arbitrability. 133 The Third Circuit stated that that specific line in their Quilloin v Tenet
HealthSystem Philadelphia Inc. case was dictum and should therefore not be followed.134
The Third Circuit reached its decision in Robert Half after discussing several factors that
demonstrate that class-wide arbitrability is a gateway matter for the courts to decide. The court
began by stating class-wide arbitrability “affects whose claims may be arbitrated” because it
includes people not aparty to the action.135 The court next stated that the “availability of class-wide
arbitration implicates the type of controversy submitted to arbitration.”136 The court cited to StoltNielson and reasoned that class arbitration is not a procedural issue but a substantive one. 137 The
court also acknowledged the differences between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration
addressed in Stolt-Nielson. 138 The court next stated that the only other court decision to address
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whether the availability of class arbitration in an arbitration agreement is a gateway issue or a
subsidiary issue was the Sixth Circuit in Reed Elsevier.139 The Third Circuit acknowledged that its
decision was guided by the Sixth Circuit decision in Reed Elsevier. 140 The Third Circuit
distinguished cases from the Eleventh, 141 First 142 and Second

143

Circuits because the Court

believed that they did not squarely address the issue of class-wide arbitrability.144
III. ANALYSIS
The Third and Sixth circuits focused on the inherent differences between bilateral and class
arbitration. The inherent differences make class arbitrabilty a gateway issue for the courts to
decide. The procedural differences of arbitration become enhanced in class arbitration and change
the nature of what is agreed to. Hence, class arbitration magnifies all the procedural differences of
bilateral arbitration, which can cause harm on the parties because class arbitration incorporates a
large number of parties. Courts should also decide whether or not an arbitration agreement permits
class arbitration because the courts are better equipped to deal with the consequences of making
the determination whether or not class arbitration is appropriate. For example, courts have
procedural safeguards to protect the parties if an improper decision is made and they also are able
to reduce some of the issues with bilateral arbitration that get expounded in class arbitration.
A.

The Inherent Differences Between Bilateral Arbitration and Class
Arbitration Make the Issue of Class Arbitrability a Gateway Matter

Gateway matters address whether or not the parties are bound by the arbitration agreement
or whether a binding arbitration clause applies to the particular issue. 145 Specifically, gateway
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matters are matters that determine if the arbitration agreement applies to the parties’ dispute.
Subsidiary questions are questions that “grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition.
146

Judge Ambro explained that subsidiary questions are questions the parties would want an

arbitrator to decide and include allegations of waiver, delay, or similar defenses to arbitrability.147
Because bilateral arbitration and class arbitration are so different, it cannot be assumed that one
party bilaterally agreeing to arbitrate the issue is the same as that party agreeing to arbitrate the
issue on a class-wide basis. The question of class arbitrability, when an arbitration agreement does
not specify that an arbitrator will decide the issue, examines whether the arbitration agreement
incorporates class action into the terms of the agreement. Therefore, it determines whether the
parties can be bound by the agreement if the dispute is arbitrated through class arbitration instead
of bilateral arbitration. Furthermore, deciding whether to allow class arbitration under arbitration
clauses is a gateway matter because the question seeks to include other parties not originally bound
by the arbitration clause. The inclusion of other parties directly bears on the question of whether
or not the parties are bound by the arbitration agreement.
a. Due Process Issues Heightened in Class Arbitration
Class arbitration requires the arbitrator to resolve disputes for multiple parties instead of
two parties, which magnifies due process concerns within class arbitration.148 Class arbitration is
structured as opt-out rather than an opt in proceedings.149 During the proceeding, arbitrators follow
either JAMS or AAA procedures for class arbitration.150 The AAA rules mandate that the arbitrator
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certify the class, stay arbitration after the class has been certified, and direct notice requirements.151
In order to certify a class, the AAA provides that “each class member has entered into an agreement
containing an arbitration clause which is substantially similar to that signed by the class
representative(s) and each of the other class members.”152 This procedural requirement does not
mandate that the class members all agree to the arbitrator appointed or have an identical arbitration
agreement. Arbitration agreements are contractual and therefore are a “matter of consent.” 153 The
decision to allow an arbitrator to decide the availability of class arbitration implies that the parties
(including absent class members) agreed to allow the arbitrator to decide issues pertaining to the
dispute. Although each class member stipulated to arbitration of the dispute, each class member
did not specifically agree to adjudicate the issue on a large scale or with the particular arbitrator.
This issue is an important difference because arbitration awards cannot be reviewed on the
merits.154 Class arbitration implicates absent party members and therefore makes the issue of class
arbitrability more than just a mere procedural question for an arbitrator to decide.
b. Conflicts of Interest
There are inherent conflicts of interest involved with class arbitration that may not be as
apparent in bilateral arbitration. The arbitrator in class arbitration must select counsel for the class
while the arbitrator in bilateral arbitration just receives notice if the party selects representation.155
This small difference may cause ethical problems for the arbitrator in class arbitration that are not
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apparent in bilateral arbitration. The AAA Supplemental Guidelines for class arbitration do not
specify any rules in which an arbitrator needs to follow to select counsel. 156 Moreover, the
arbitrator is appointed by the original counsel in the dispute.157 The potential conflict occurs after
the appointment of the arbitrator and before the certification of the counsel.158 Here the arbitrator
that was chosen by the counsel must choose/ certify the counsel that appointed him. This is an
inherent conflict of interest because the arbitrator may be inclined to appoint someone that
appointed him as a possible return of the favor.
Moreover, arbitrators may face difficult decisions after settlements have been approved.
For example, an arbitrator may be “asked to apportion the arbitration costs between the plaintiffs
and the defendants.”159 Further, an arbitrator may have to award counsel fees or decide if the
settlement fund will “reimburse class counsel for arbitration expenses (including the arbitrator’s
fees).”160
The main cause of concern comes with the large number of parties in class arbitration. For
example, one biased arbitrator has the potential to affect hundreds of class members in one
decision, whereas a biased arbitrator in a bilateral arbitration proceeding will only affect two
parties. The conflicts are not apparent in bilateral arbitration, which depicts a substantial difference
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between the two types of arbitration. The difference depicts why class arbitratbility is a gateway
matter because it substantially changes the nature of the arbitration agreement parties agreed to.
An arbitrator should not be determine whether the arbitration agreement allows class arbitration
unless the parties specifically stipulate that the arbitrator has the power to do so.
c. Procedural Formalities of Class Arbitration Limit the Benefits of
Arbitration
The procedural formalities of class arbitration create an increased burden on the parties,
which limit the benefits of class arbitration.161 The Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielson warned that
“the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less assured, giving reason to doubt the
parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes through class-wide arbitration.”162 For example, class
arbitration tends to last longer than bilateral arbitration.163 This increase in time ultimately changes
one of the most significant aspects of arbitration—speed. A major benefit of arbitration is the speed
of the action and the lack of reliance on courts to decide the action, which can take months or
years. Allowing an arbitrator to decide if an arbitration clause allows for class arbitration allows
the arbitrator to make a substantial decision.
In addition, many parties agree to arbitration to avoid expensive costs of litigation. 164 The
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procedural benefit of avoiding expensive costs cannot be inferred in class arbitration because class
arbitration is much more costly than bilateral arbitration due to the procedural requirements such
as notice.165 For example the court in Eisen found the notice cost to be roughly $225,000.166 The
notice cost only incorporated mailing letters to roughly two million people at a stamp rate of six
cents, which would be much higher today.167 The price on notice is astronomical for a party that
just wants to settle a small claim and did not intend their arbitration clause to be construed to allow
class arbitration. This jump in cost is substantial and cannot just be regarded as a subsidiary issue
to the arbitration dispute. This issue would be important enough to change the intent of the parties
because the plaintiff would bear the burden of the notice costs. Although the plaintiff makes the
decision to bring the dispute forward as class arbitration, absent class members that have not opted
out may not have wanted to move forward with the dispute as a class arbitration.
Privacy of the arbitration agreement is also changed in regard to class arbitration. The
AAA’s Rules on Class arbitration mandate that privacy and confidentiality of the proceeding will
not apply to class arbitration.168 Parties that agreed to arbitration may not have agreed to arbitration
that is not confidential. For example, companies may prefer arbitration due to the confidentiality
and the efficiency of the process, but class arbitration potentially frustrates their assumption for a
speedy confidential process. The lack of confidentiality may cause certain issues to leak to the
press and cause bad publicity for the company. Further, plaintiffs may have wanted a confidential
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proceeding when they argue their issue with the court. Under the lack of confidentiality, not only
does an entire class know the proceeding, but anyone can be informed about the arbitration. The
lack of privacy is a substantial difference between bilateral and class arbitration and would be a
reason why the courts should determine whether of not the parties agreed to class arbitration.
d. Class Arbitration Binds Absent Party Members
Class arbitration differs principally from bilateral arbitration because of its nature to bind
class members not part of the original contract. Arbitration is a matter of consent, but class
arbitration allows parties to be part of a class where the individuals did not consent to the
arbitration.169 The AAA’s Supplemental Rules for Class arbitration track Fed. Civ. R. 23 but add
the requirement that each class member have a similar arbitration clause to one another. 170
Although this rule adds more commonality amongst the class members, it does not require the
class members to agree to class arbitration. This lack of consent by other parties denotes that class
arbitration is not just an issue that grows out of the dispute, but an issue that has potentially far
reaching affects. As previously discussed, class arbitration changes the nature of the arbitration at
hand. The parties no longer have privacy in their dispute, there are increased costs, and the
arbitration proceeding lasts longs. Therefore, the parties that have not opted out become members
of the class arbitration with no judicial review of the merits of the arbitration award.171
e. Increased Risk to the Parties in Class Arbitration
In Concepcion the Supreme Court discussed the increased risk in class arbitration. They
stated,
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Informal procedures do of course have a cost: The absence of
multilayered review makes it more likely that errors will go
uncorrected. Defendants are willing to accept the costs of these
errors in arbitration, since their impact is limited to the size of
individual disputes, and presumably outweighed by savings from
avoiding the courts. But when damages allegedly owed to tens of
thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once,
the risk of an error will often become unacceptable. Faced with even
a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured
into settling questionable claims.172
The magnitude of the dispute resolution inherently changes how parties will act or settle a matter.
This new bargaining power associated with class action claims is significant and could potentially
alter the outcome of the dispute, which makes class arbitration very different from bilateral
arbitration. As the Supreme Court noted, the risk is substantial to the defendant because the
defendant essentially could lose thousands of claims that were decided once through aggregation.
Furthermore, some of the important procedural aspects of court proceedings are not
available in arbitration. This causes a minor issue in an individual arbitration proceeding to have
catastrophic effects in a class arbitration proceeding because the impact exponentially grows. For
example, in bilateral arbitration discovery is limited and is not governed consistently.173 Instead of
this limited discovery being an issue in one small matter, class arbitration makes limited discovery
the basis of a decision that could potentially affect thousands of individuals.
In addition, the checks and balances associated in the judicial process are not available in
class arbitration, which make class arbitration riskier to the parties than bilateral arbitration that
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just deals with two parties. In class arbitration, the final award is not as easily appealed as a final
court judgment. Arbitral awards are only vacated
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material
to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made.174
This processes makes vacating an arbitral award more difficult than regular class action awards
decided by a court. The Supreme Court has also noted that the judicial review of the arbitrator’s
decision lacks the necessary review to decrease the risk of error.175 The difficulty in vacating an
arbitral award coupled with the added complexity stemming from multiple parties creates an
increased risk of error if the arbitrator decided the issue incorrectly. Whereas, in bilateral
arbitration, the risk of error is small because only the one dispute would be sided incorrectly as
opposed to thousands of parties.
f. Courts Are Better Suited to Deal Class Arbitration because It Will Provide
Binding Precedent for Parties to Follow
Courts should make the determination of class arbitrability because they are better suited
to deal with all of the repercussions of class arbitration determinations than arbitrators are. They
are better suited because of the structure of the judicial system. Arbitrators are free to make a
decision in their dispute based on applicable law but their decisions are not binding on the next
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arbitration matter. 176 Therefore, if arbitrators are allowed to decide disputes about of class
arbitrability, there will be no precedent for them to follow when trying to formulate a framework
or decision process. On the other hand, courts function on precedential opinion, and they therefore
can formulate a framework on how to address if a party can proceed to class arbitration.
There reliance on precedent will provide more stability in what constitutes an arbitration
clause that permits class arbitration and what does not; thus it benefits employers/corporations and
employees/consumers. This reliance on precedent allows for more confidence in the arbitration
clause at hand. Mike Jones, a Reed Smith LLP partner, stated that “Employers ought to be
confident now that they can adopt polices to completely eliminate the risk of class-based litigation
and have a faster, cheaper alternative to the litigation of employment claims in court.”177 Courts
deciding whether or not class arbitration is permitted create more stability in what constitutes an
arbitration clause that allows class arbitration. Courts will have binding precedent to guide their
decisions; whereas arbitrators make independent decisions and have no precedent to follow.
Courts deciding whether or not an arbitration clause is permitted allows for more
uniformity not just in their basing their decision on precedents, but the availability of appeals for
the parties affected by the decision. For example, courts deciding class arbitrability makes it easier
for employers to appeal the decision.178 Employers no longer have to find some type of misconduct
in the arbitrator’s decision because they can appeal the decision through regular court procedures.
This is especially helpful if there is a mistake made in the analysis. Employers would now be able
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to cite to the law and appeal the decision. This cuts the same way for employees, who would also
have a procedural mechanism to appeal the court’s decision if it is not based on precedential law.179
Therefore, the ability to appeal will allow for more stability because the courts will base their
decisions on existing law.
Further, allowing courts to decide whether or not an arbitration agreement permits classwide arbitration reduces the risk of bias. Arbitrators are paid based on their role in the arbitration,
whereas judges are governmental employees that are not paid based on their role in a particular
dispute. Arbitrators may be more inclined to find that the arbitration agreement permits class
arbitration because they financially benefit from this finding.180 Taking this decision away from
arbitrators allows arbitrators to focus on the dispute if it does warrant class arbitration and takes
away the risk that they will focus more on their personal gain than the dispute at hand. Furthermore,
it is good for employees/consumers because they can avoid arbitrator bias.181 Arbitrator bias is
inherent when employers/ large corporations hire arbitrators that make decisions in
corporation/employer’s favor.182

Although courts would make the decision of class

arbitrability when the parties are silent on the issue of class arbitration, the decision of the Third
and Sixth Circuits would still allow parties to stipulate that an arbitrator should make that decision.

IV. CONCLUSION
An arbitration agreement that does not specifically mention class arbitration but has a
contractual basis for assuming that class arbitration is included, poses many issues. Currently there

179

28 U.S.C.S § 1292
supra note 167
181
Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of
Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238-39 (1998) (study of arbitrations between 1993
and 1995)
182
supra note 171
180

27

is no binding Supreme Court precedent to follow in deciding whether a court or an arbitrator makes
the decision. The Sixth and Third Circuits, using Supreme Court dicta, have held that the
differences between bilateral and class arbitration cause the decision of class arbitrability to be a
gateway question instead of a subsidiary question.
The analysis by Sixth and Third Circuits are correct because they focus on the extensive
differences of bilateral and class arbitration. Because bilateral arbitration and class arbitration are
so different, it cannot be assumed that one party bilaterally agreeing to arbitrate the issue is the
same as that party agreeing to arbitrate the issue on a class-wide basis. Put differently, the
differences between the class and bilateral arbitration change the agreement so much that it makes
question of class arbitrability is a gateway issue. It cannot presumed that arbitrators have the power
to decide the issue, when the question of class arbitrability is about whether or not the specific
issue is permitted in the arbitration agreement. The two types of arbitration differ so substantially,
that allowing arbitrators to make the class arbitrability decision would give arbitrators more power
under the arbitration agreement.
In addition, courts should determine the availability of class arbitration under an arbitration
agreement because they are better suited to weigh the inherent issues with class arbitration. Courts
provide safeguards of their decision by allowing parties to appeal. This will limit the amount of
instances that parties will need to proceed with class arbitration when their arbitration clause did
not provide for it at all. Further, the impartiality of the judges in the court system will provide for
a uniform manner of addressing class arbitration that will give the topic more stability.
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